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SOME STATISTICS AND COMMENTS ON THE
STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE IN VIRGINIA
Virginia law as it stands today makes it difficult to obtain a
divorce on any ground other than desertion.' In fact, the common
grounds of cruelty, drunkenness, and incompatibility are simply
not available to one who is seeking an outright final a vinerdo
divorce.2 And in the Virginia divorce cases based on adultery,
3
the courts have been very stringent in their requirement of proof.
But allegations of desertion are relatively simple to formulate and
their proof is easy to sustain. In addition to the formal statutory
requirement of residency,4 a complainant generally needs merely
to allege desertion by the spouse, and upon corroboration by a
relative or friend, the complainant is granted an avineulo divorce.5
The process is virtually automatic.
As might be expected from this status of the law, the number
of divorces granted on the grounds of desertion is far in excess of
those obtained on all other grounds taken together. A statistical
sampling of various areas in Virginia for 1958 dearly shows this
overwhelming preponderance:
TABLE I.

Divorces Granted in Virginia, 19586
Virginia ................

Desertion Adultery
6,184
247

Imprison- Misc.
ment
Grounds Total
102
11
6,544

1Va. Code Ann. § 20-91 (1960 RepI. vol.).
2

Va. Code Ann. § 20-95 (1960 Repl. vol.).

3

See, e.g., Haskins v. Haskins, 188 Va. 525, 50 S.E. 2d 437 (1948). In this
case, Respondent on several evenings had called at a woman's apartment,
arriving
early in the evening and remaining until about midnight. Detectives testified
that at ie during these evenig all lights were out in the
apartment. In denying a divorce, the court said:". if the evidence were
given all the weight to which it was entitled, and all reasonable inferences
therefrom were accorded defendant [sic], yet to the guarded discretion and
judgment of a reasonable man it fell short of proof of plaintiff's adultery
because it failed to point with reasonable certainty to a conclusion of guilt
and left one groping in the realm of surmise, conjecture and speculation."

4

Va. Code Ann. § 20-97 (1960 Repl. vol.). Domicile and residential requirements.

5

See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 196 Va. 698, 85 S.E. 2d 211 (1957).
Bureau of Vital Statistics, Richmond, Va.

6
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Some Counties:

Accomack ..............................
Arlington .................................
Charles City ....................

Chesterfield ...........................
Dinwiddie ..............................
Essex .....................................
Some Cities:
Alexandria ..............................
Danville ................................
Hampton .................................

Norfolk ....................................
Richmond ..............................
Williamsburg .....................
W inchester

...........................

Compare this data with a similar statisical sampling of other
jurisdictions, and the lopsidedness of the Virginia pattern becomes
even more apparent:
TABLE II.

Divorces and Annulments by Legal Grounds for Divorce, 19587
Deser- Drunken- Misc.
Adultery Bigamy Cruelty tion(a) ness Grounds(b) Total
State
175
12,311
6,175 5,210
313
415
23
Alabama ..................
1,560
7,975
2
4,977 1,207
198
Georgia .....................
31
94
4,299
39
24
3,864
222
56
Iowa ...........................
5,452
2
4,693
469
9
258
Oregon ........................
21
6
52
641
5
508
69
1
South Dakota
243
4,499
200
6
3,946
74
Wisconsin ............... 30
(a) Both constructive and willful.
(b) Includes conviction of crime, fraud, insanity, nonsupport, and under age.

Although it is beyond the scope of this note to investigate
exhaustively the reasons behind this inordinately large proportion
of divorce cases based on desertion, some suggestions are proffered
for consideration. First, an examination of the divorce cases
appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia8 shows that desertion
cases are less likely to be appealed, and where they are appealed,
they are less likely to be reversed. From 1930 to 1960, for example, seven out of thirteen Virginia adultery cases were reversed
7
8

National Office of Vital Statistics.

Arrington v. Arrington, 196 Va. 86, 82 S.E. 2d 548 (1955). "This court has
jurisdiction to review by appeal a decree of the court below in matters
of divorce, regardless of any question of the amount in controversy."

Noms
on appea 9 while eight out of twenty-four desertion cases were
reversed.' ° This, coupled with the large ratio of desertion cases
to adultery cases at the lower court level, as reflected by TABLE
I above, would tend to indicate a greater resistance on the part
of a respondent to a charge of adulterous acts than to the more
innocuous charge of desertion. Second, there is the obvious
social stigma and embarrassment connected with divorce litigation, which a complainant would naturally desire to minimize.
A complainant would therefore be hesitant to allege insanity,
conviction of a crime, or one of the more sordid grounds in order
to obtain a divorce decree when there is available to him the more
delicate and, for the respondent, the more palatable ground of
desertion. Third, and perhaps most significant and worthy of
comment, is the fact that from a technical and procedural standpoint, desertion is the path of least resistance for a married
couple who wish to seek a divorce, no matter what their real
motives may be for desiring it.
In this last connection it would indeed be naive, in the light
of the data presented in TABLES I and II, to contend seriously
that desertion was the actual basis for such a large percentage of
Virginia divorces. The present state of the Virginia divorce law
virtually encourages collusion on the part of couples seeking
a divorce, and little ingenuity is needed to obtain a divorce on
such grounds." In fact, it would be reasonably accurate to say
that the prime requisites for a divorce today in Virginia are a
marriage ceremony and a few hundred dollars. The adversary
system has clearly become a legal fiction, and the trend seems to
indicate that Virginia divorce laws will become even more lenient
and increasingly susceptible to collusive suits.12
It is ridiculous to have before the public a divorce law policy
that invites collusion and deceit. To allow the divorce laws to be
97 Va. Digest 553, and Cum. Supp. at p. 91 (Divorce, Key No. 129(1)).
107 Va. Digest 560, and Cum. Supp. at p. 92 (Divorce, Key No. 133(1)).
l t he legal ethics aspects of collusion in divorce suits are examined in Drinker,
Problems of Professional Ethics in Matrimonial Litigation, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 443 (1953).
12Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-91 and 20-118 (1960 RepI. vol.). Formerly, § 20-118
provided that neither party could remarry within four months after an
a vinculo decree had been entered. This restriction has now been removed.
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so easily manipulated by those who desire a divorce makes the
proceedings a mockery and creates a general disrespect for the
law. Statutes which allow such a legal fiction to flourish should
not be tolerated in an area of law that so vitally affects the moral
fiber of our society.
ALEXANDER J. MICHALOS

